Stereotyping and Harassment
Gender Stereotyping and Harassment: A “Catch-22” for Women in the Workplace
Emily A. Leskinen Carthage College
Verónica Caridad Rabelo and Lilia M. Cortina University of Michigan
United States law recognizes the illegality of sex/gender stereotyping when it drives formal discrimination in employment, as in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins (1989). In the present study, we investigated whether such stereotyping—and attendant intolerance for counterstereotypicality—also breeds discrimination in the form of gender harassment. That is, we examined whether and how different components of gender counterstereotypicality combined to affect women’s risk of being targeted with harassment. Using a sample of 425 working women, we tested how deviations from stereotypical femininity—masculine appearance, masculine-typed behaviors (aggression and self- reliance), and work in a masculine context—related to women’s experiences of gender harassment (specifically, sexist remarks and gender policing). We found that women were caught in a “catch- 22:” Professional success in many highly compensated fields requires stereotypically masculine behavior and appearance, but those same attributes increased women’s harassment risk. Taken together, our findings carry methodological, practical, and legal implications. If working women are penalized for their gender deviance through different forms of gender harassment, particularly in certain work domains, this may fuel gender discrepancies in particular fields. There could be a cumulative impact on women throughout their careers, from hiring to evaluation to advancement up the ranks. Methodologically, this study can expand our understandings of how to operationalize gender role violation and parse apart different manifestations of workplace harassment. It can also inform debates about relationships between sex stereotyping, harassment, and the law.
Keywords: stereotypes, harassment, gender discrimination, gender norms, sexism
In 1982, the Price Waterhouse accounting firm denied Ann Hopkins partnership despite her strong qualifications. To increase chances of future promotion, a partner advised Hopkins to “walk more femininely, talk more femininely, dress more femininely, wear make-up, have her hair styled, and wear jewelry,” implying that Hopkins’ counterstereotypic behavior and appearance marred her candidacy (Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 1989, p. 235). The U.S. Supreme Court ultimately ruled that denying Hopkins’ part- nership was driven by gender stereotyping (termed “sex stereotyp- ing” by the Court), violating Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
Prior to Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins (1989) the Court heard other cases about the legality of sanctions toward those who fail to adhere to traditional gender stereotypes. In the early 1970s, Ruth Bader Ginsburg often litigated on behalf of male sex discrimina-
tion plaintiffs, even when the idea of sex discrimination against- men was considered laughable by lawyers and judges (Franklin, 2010). Some legal theorists have argued that Ginsburg’s litigation of male sex discrimination cases may have, in fact, been strategic (e.g., Cole, 1984) and that her litigation strategy was instrumental in leading the Supreme Court to recognize sex stereotyping as actionable sex discrimination (Bornstein, 2012). According to Bornstein (2012, p. 1299):
Consistent with Ginsburg’s early construction of sex discrimina- tion as based on stereotypes, jurisprudence under Title VII now recognizes a gender stereotyping theory, under which workplace penalties and harassment of individuals for failing to conform to gender stereotypes may be actionable sex discrimination.
Courts now recognize (such as in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins) the illegality of sex stereotyping and disdain for a woman’s deviation from traditional gender stereotypes when it fuels formal discrimina- tion in employment, or “discrimination in hiring, promotions, access, and resource distribution” (Fiske, Bersoff, Borgida, Deaux, & Hei- lman, 1991; Hebl, Foster, Mannix, & Dovidio, 2002, p. 816; see also overt discrimination, Dovidio & Gaertner, 2000; Gaertner & Dovidio, 1986). However, in the present study, we were interested in whether such sex stereotyping and intolerance for counterstereotypicality bred discrimination in the form of gender harassment. Gender harassment consists of behaviors that belittle and demean individuals based on their gender. It is a specific subtype of sexual harassment that can, at times, rise to the level of a Title VII violation.
Emily A. Leskinen, Department of Psychological Science, Carthage College; Verónica Caridad Rabelo and Lilia M. Cortina, Departments of Psychology and Women’s Studies, University of Michigan.
Grants from the University of Michigan’s Institute for Research on Women and Gender and Center for the Education of Women supported this work. We are grateful to Dana Kabat-Farr, Lisa Marchiondo, and Samantha Montgomery for their invaluable contributions to this data collection.
Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Emily A. Leskinen, Department of Psychological Science, Carthage College, 2001 Alford Park Drive, Kenosha, WI 53140. E-mail: eleskinen@cart