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Psychology of Women Quarterly, 33 (2009), 206–215. Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Printed in the USA. Copyright C© 2009 Division 35, American Psychological Association. 0361-6843/09

WHAT’S IN A LABEL? JUDGMENTS OF FEMINIST MEN AND FEMINIST WOMEN

Veanne N. Anderson Indiana State University

Although significant progress has been made on research concerning stereotypes of feminist women, very little is known about the stereotypes of feminist men. College students rated one of four terms—“feminist man,” “feminist woman,” “man,” or “woman.” Compared to “feminist woman,” “feminist man” was evaluated more positively, but as less potent (i.e., lower in stereotypically masculine characteristics) and less heterosexual. Although feminist man had the highest evaluative ratings of the four terms and was rated similarly in confidence to woman and man, compared to the other terms it was rated low in attractiveness and potency. These results suggest that at least on some dimensions a feminist man’s masculinity may be questioned, which in turn may be a hindrance to men in adopting the feminist label.

Attitudes toward feminists frequently exhibit a “Jekyll and Hyde” quality (Edley & Wetherell, 2001) wherein femi- nists are both admired and reviled. Feminists are viewed as being competent, independent, and intelligent (DeWall, Altermatt, & Thompson, 2005; Fiske, Cuddy, Glick, & Xu, 2002; Suter & Toller, 2006), while at the same time they are also viewed as man-hating extremists, angry, and phys- ically and sexually unattractive (Alexander & Ryan, 1997; Goldberg, Gottesdiener, & Abramson, 1975; Rubin, 1994; Rudman & Fairchild, 2007; Twenge & Zucker, 1999). This duality in stereotypes undoubtedly contributes to the reluc- tance of many women to identify themselves as feminists even when they support feminist goals (Alexander & Ryan, 1997; Burn, Aboud, & Moyles, 2000; Buschman & Lenart, 1996; Henderson-King & Zhermer, 2003; Jackson, Fleury, & Lewandowski, 1996; McCabe, 2005; Nelson, Shana- han, & Olivetti, 1997; Peltola, Milkie, & Presser, 2004; Twenge & Zucker, 1999; Williams & Wittig, 1997; Zucker, 2004).

Men have played and continue to play important roles in the feminist movement; however, they are much less likely than women to identify themselves as feminists (Breen

Veanne N. Anderson, Department of Psychology, Indiana State University.

I thank Jessica Fischer, Jennifer Norris, and Sarah Sparks for assistance with data collection and Eric Anderson, Gloria Cowan, and three anonymous reviewers for helpful comments on earlier drafts. Portions of these results were presented at the Association for Psychological Science, Chicago, IL on May 22–25, 2008.

Address correspondence and reprint requests to: Veanne N. Anderson, Department of Psychology, Indiana State University, Terre Haute, IN 47809. E-mail: [email protected]

& Karpinski, 2008; Burn et al., 2000; Henderson-King & Zhermer, 2003; Jackson et al., 1996; Peltola et al., 2004; Pierce, Sydie, Stratkotter, & Krull, 2003; Williams & Wittig, 1997). As with stereotypes about feminist women, stereo- types about feminist men may negatively affect their will- ingness to adopt the feminist label and become active in the feminist movement. This in turn may contribute further to the slow pace of movement toward gender egalitarianism. However, little is known about stereotypes about feminist men and whether they might differ from stereotypes about feminist women.

Only a small number of studies have examined stereo- types about feminist men. Twenge and Zucker (1999) had college students write a story in response to one of two statements: “Michelle calls herself a feminist” or “Michael calls himself a feminist.” Although many students wrote positive statements about Michelle and Michael, a signifi- cant number wrote negative statements. For example, one person “claimed that Michael is a cross-dresser by night” (p. 60), and another wrote “‘Michael probably denounces his manhood. . .’” (p. 60). Students were also more likely to mention assertive behavior for the feminist woman than for the feminist man. In a more recent study, Breen and Karpinski (2008) examined the evaluation of a hypothetical man or woman that was either a feminist or nonfeminist. The feminist woman was rated more favorably than the non- feminist woman, whereas the feminist man was rated less favorably than the nonfeminist man. They did not report whether the feminist man was rated more or less favorably than the feminist woman; however, a t test on the available statistics indicated that the feminist man was evaluated less positively than the feminist woman, t(26) = −2.1, p ≤ .05. Finally, Gourley and Anderson (2007) had college students

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Judgments of Feminist Men 207

rate videotaped female and male speakers who identified themselves as feminists or did not mention their feminist orientation. The feminist label did not affect the ratings of the speakers with one exception; the feminist male speaker was rated as more likely to be gay or bisexual than the male speaker who did not identify as a feminist. Thus, stereo- types may have different constructions for feminist men and feminist women.

The primary purpose of the current study was to inves- tigate judgments or stereotypes of feminist men in more detail. My study followed the procedures of Pierce et al. (2003), who compared college students’ ratings of the con- cept “feminist” to the concepts “man” and “woman.” Based on the ratings of 61 semantic differential scales, Pierce et al. (2003) identified four dimensions: evaluative (i.e., pleasant–unpleasant), potency (i.e., decisive–indecisive), expressiveness (i.e., emotional–unemotional), and sexuality (i.e., sexual–asexual). Compared to the concepts “woman” and “man”, “feminist” was rated more negatively on the evaluative and sexuality dimensions and more positively on the potency dimension. “Feminist” was also rated as more expressive than “man” but less expressive than “woman.” The participant’s gender was also significant, with men rat- ing “feminist” more negatively on the evaluative and sex- uality dimensions than did women. It is probably safe to assume that the term or concept “feminist” evokes images of women rather than men (Berryman-Fink & Verderber, 1985; Williams & Wittig, 1997). To be clear about the sex of the feminist target, in the current study, participants rated the terms “feminist man” and “feminist woman” in addi- tion to “man” and “woman.” This study also improves on and adds to Breen and Karpinski’s research (2008); they used only three items in their measure of negative impres- sion of feminists and nonfeminists, and their sample of men was relatively small.

The paucity of research on attitudes toward feminist men makes predictions difficult; nevertheless, the liter- ature on attitudes toward feminist women may provide a basis for some predictions. Feminist women are evalu- ated more negatively and are rated as less attractive than women and men (DeWall et al., 2005; Pierce et al., 2003; Rudman & Fairchild, 2007; but see Breen & Karpinski, 2008), Thus, the term “feminist man” may also receive more negative evaluations and lower attractiveness ratings when compared to “woman” and “man.” Given that men tend to have more negative attitudes toward feminist women than do women (Burn et al., 2000; Hartung & Rogers, 2000; Henderson-King & Zhermer, 2003; Jackson et al., 1996; Lottes & Kuriloff, 1994; McCabe, 2005; Nelson et al., 1997; Peltola et al., 2004; Pierce et al., 2003; Rosell & Hartman, 2001; Rudman & Fairchild, 2007; Twenge, 1999; Twenge & Zucker, 1999; Williams & Wittig, 1997), I predicted that men’s ratings of “feminist man” would be more negative than women’s ratings. Based on research by Breen and Karpinski (2008) and Twenge and Zucker (1999), I also predicted that the term “feminist man” would be evaluated

more negatively and rated as less attractive than the term “feminist woman.”

More stereotypically masculine (or less stereotypically feminine) characteristics are sometimes associated with feminist women (DeWall et al., 2005; Fiske et al., 2002; Goldberg et al., 1975; Pierce et al., 2003; Rubin, 1994; Suter & Toller, 2006). A parallel phenomenon may occur with the term “feminist man.” Because the term “feminist” is more likely to elicit images of women (Berryman-Fink & Verderber, 1985; Williams & Wittig, 1997), when people see the term “feminist man” they may think of a feminized man or a man who has eschewed his masculinity. As such, “feminist man” might be rated as having more stereotyp- ically feminine characteristics than “feminist woman” and “man.” Also, “feminist man” might be rated as more likely to be homosexual than “feminist woman” (Gourley & An- derson, 2007). Finally, research demonstrates that women (Breen & Karpinski, 2008; Liss, O’Connor, Morosky, & Crawford, 2001; Myaskovsky & Wittig, 1997; Ramsey et al., 2007) and men (Breen & Karpinski, 2008) with strong fem- inist identifications provide more positive evaluations of feminists than people with weak feminist identifications. Therefore, I predicted that participants with stronger femi- nist identifications would rate “feminist woman” and “fem- inist man” more positively than participants with weaker feminist identifications.

METHOD

Participants

Participants were 411 university students enrolled in psy- chology classes. Data for seven students were excluded from the analyses because of missing demographic informa- tion (five students), missing ratings (one woman), or biased responding (one woman rated all items the same); this left a sample of 404 students (275 women; 129 men). Of these, 80.7% were White/Caucasian, 12.6% Black/African Amer- ican, 2.7% Asian/Asian American, 2% Hispanic/Latina(o), 1.2% Other, and .7% Native American/American Indian. The age ranged from 18 to 41 years (M = 19.1, SD = 2.3).

Materials

Students rated one of four terms (“man,” “woman,” “fem- inist man,” or “feminist woman”) on 65 semantic differen- tial scales. The term was in boldfaced letters at the top of each of the two pages of the questionnaire. There were two randomized orders of the semantic differential scales to partially control for possible order effects.

Sixty-three of the 65 semantic differential scales were the same as those used in Pierce et al.’s (2003) study, with some revisions. Four pairs of their scales shared an anchor (peaceful–militant and peaceful–ferocious; emotional– unemotional and emotional–rational; fragile–tough and fragile–sturdy; certain–uncertain and assured–uncertain).

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The shared anchor in one of the pairs was replaced with an appropriate synonym (tame–ferocious; rational–irrational; frail–sturdy; assured–unsure). As in Pierce et al. (2003), two scales, hard–soft and kind–cruel, were included twice as reliability checks; only the first occurrence of the pair was included in the data analyses. Two scales were added (homosexual–heterosexual and attractive–unattractive) be- cause previous research indicates that people may discrim- inate between feminists and other subgroups on these di- mensions. Responses were on a scale from 1 to 5; they were recoded as 1 = +2, 2 = +1, 3 = 0, 4 = −1, and 5 = −2 for analyses (see Pierce et al., 2003).

After completing the semantic differential ratings, par- ticipants provided information on their race, sex, year in school, age, and feminist identification. Feminist identifi- cation was measured by having students choose one of the following seven statements developed by Myaskovsky and Wittig (1997): (1) I do not consider myself a feminist at all, and I believe that feminists are harmful to family life and undermine relations between women and men; (2) I do not consider myself a feminist; (3) I agree with some of the objectives of the feminist movement but do not call myself a feminist; (4) I agree with most of the objectives of the feminist movement but do not call myself a feminist; (5) I privately consider myself a feminist but do not call myself a feminist around others; (6) I call myself a feminist around others; and (7) I call myself a feminist around others and am currently active in the women’s movement. Higher scores indicated a stronger feminist identification.

Procedure

Students were tested in large groups in their psychology classes by four White female researchers (one researcher per testing session). They were told that the study was on perceptions of groups of women and men and that we were interested in their “gut reactions” to the questionnaire items. The questionnaires were randomly distributed, and the students recorded their responses on the questionnaires and scantron sheets. About half of the students received one of the two orders (n = 201, 137 women and 64 men; n = 203, 138 women and 65 men). Sample sizes in the four experimental conditions were as follows: “woman,” n = 10 (61 women, 39 men); “man,” n = 10 (76 women, 24 men); “feminist woman,” n = 99 (65 women, 34 men); and “feminist man,” n = 105 (73 women, 32 men).

RESULTS

Feminist Identification

Two women did not indicate their feminist identification. On average, women (M = 3.0, SD = 1.1) had a signifi- cantly stronger feminist identification than men (M = 2.3, SD = .9), t(40) = 5.9, p < .01. A higher percentage of men (59.7%) than women (30.1%) did not consider themselves feminists (endorsement of the first two statements). The

most popular choice for women was to agree with some ob- jectives of the feminist movement but not call themselves a feminist (45.4%); this was the second most popular choice for men (32.6%). Agreeing with most of the objectives of the feminist movement but not calling themselves femi- nists was endorsed by 17.9% of the women and 7% of the men. Only 6.6% (n = 18) of the women and .8% (n = 1) of the men called themselves a feminist privately or publicly (scores of 5, 6, or 7). The level of feminist identification did not differ as a function of which term the participants rated, F(3, 398) = 2.34, p = .072.

Data Reduction

In keeping with Pierce et al. (2003), data were reduced by using a principal components factor analysis with varimax rotation on the 63 semantic differential scales. Similar to Pierce et al. (2003), items were included in a factor if their factor loadings were .50 or greater and if the cross-loadings were less than .35. Twelve factors were extracted with eigenvalues of 1.0 or higher. However, of those 12 factors, 5 had only one item each that met the criteria for inclusion, and 3 had no items that met the criteria. The remaining four factors accounted for 45.1% of the variance (see Table 1 for items and factor loadings). Seventeen items were included in the first factor (eigenvalue = 16.5; 26.1% of variance), of which 13 overlapped with the items in Pierce et al.’s (2003) evaluative factor. This factor appeared to be a measure of overall evaluation (see also Osgood, Suci, & Tannen- baum, 1957) and was also labeled evaluative. The second factor consisted of seven items (eigenvalue = 6.5; 10.4% of variance), of which only two, emotional–unemotional and feminine–masculine, overlapped with Pierce et al.’s (2003) expressive factor. I labeled this second factor po- tency because it shared some of the items with Osgood et al.’s (1957) potency dimension (e.g., weak–strong, light– heavy, feminine–masculine). Potency seems to assess char- acteristics that are stereotypically associated with women (i.e., weak, emotional, feminine, submissive) or men (i.e., strong, unemotional, masculine, dominant). Factor three consisted of four items (eigenvalue = 3.1; 4.9% of vari- ance). None of the items overlapped with Pierce et al.’s (2003) sexuality factor, although the items did reflect a measure of sexual/physical attractiveness; hence, this fac- tor was labeled sexual/physical attractiveness. The fourth factor had four items (eigenvalue = 2.3; 3.6% of variance). Three of these items overlapped with Pierce et al.’s potency factor (not to be confused with Osgood et al.’s (1957) po- tency dimension); however, the label confidence was used in this study because it seemed a more accurate descriptor of the dimension.1

The alpha coefficients for the four factors were .93 (evaluative), .87 (potency), .85 (sexual/physical attractive- ness), and .70 (confidence). The items in each factor were summed, and the average item score, which could range from −2 to +2, was used in the analyses described

Judgments of Feminist Men 209

Table 1 Items and Factor Loadings for the Evaluative, Potency, Sexual/physical Attractiveness, and Confidence

Dimensions (N = 404)

Evaluative Potency Attractiveness

Cooperative–uncooperative (.742) Feminine–masculine (.821) Sexy–sexless (.764) Nice–awful (.741) Fragile–tough (.800) Attractive–unattractive (.762) Positive–negative (.715) Frail–sturdy (.757) Beautiful–ugly (.737) Forgiving–unforgiving (.676) Emotional–unemotional (.687) Desirable–undesirable (.709) Good-natured–irritable (.674) Weak–strong (.675) Harmonious–argumentative (.665) Light–heavy (.648) Rational–irrational (.629) Submissive–dominant (.606) Tolerant–intolerant (.628) Affectionate–mean (.624) Confidence Kind–cruel (.617) Certain–uncertain (.689) Relaxed–tense (.599) Decisive–indecisive (.627) Cheerful–sullen (.591) Assured–unsure (.611) Patient–impatient (.587) Disciplined–undisciplined (.550) Warm–cold (.573) Fair–unfair (.533) Lenient–severe (.523) Beneficial–harmful (.512)

below. Higher and more positive scores indicated a more positive evaluation and higher levels of attractiveness and confidence. The scores for items in the potency dimension were reversed such that higher scores indicated higher lev- els of potency. I also analyzed ratings for the homosexual– heterosexual scale; higher scores indicated a more hetero- sexual orientation for the term.

Correlations

The zero-order correlations among the four dimensions and the homosexual–heterosexual ratings are presented in Table 2. More positive evaluative scores were significantly correlated with lower levels of potency and higher levels of attractiveness and confidence. Higher levels of confidence were also correlated with higher levels of potency and at- tractiveness and a slightly more heterosexual orientation. Finally, a more heterosexual rating was correlated signifi- cantly with higher levels of potency and attractiveness.

Table 2 Correlations Among the Ratings for the Four Dimensions

and the Homosexual–Heterosexual Scale

1 2 3 4 5

1. Evaluative – −.33∗∗∗ .49∗∗∗ .30∗∗∗ .09 2. Potency – .04 .28∗∗∗ .34∗∗∗ 3. Attractiveness – .16∗∗∗ .39∗∗∗ 4. Confidence – .11∗ 5. Homosexual– –

Heterosexual

Note. The sample size for all correlations was N = 404. ∗p < .05. ∗∗∗p ≤ .001.

Correlations were also calculated separately for the feminist-labeled terms for women and men. Because of the large overlap between women and men in significant correlations, only the correlations collapsed across gender are presented in Table 3. There were several differences in significant correlations for “feminist man” and “feminist woman.” Higher confidence levels were associated with more positive evaluative and attractiveness ratings for “fem- inist man” but not for “feminist woman.” Whereas higher levels of heterosexuality were predicted by higher levels of potency (or scores reflective of stereotypically masculine characteristics) for “feminist man,” higher levels of hetero- sexuality were predicted by higher levels of attractiveness for “feminist woman.” Although higher levels of potency predicted higher confidence levels for “feminist woman,” they were also associated with more negative evaluative and

Table 3 Correlations Among Ratings for “Feminist Man” and

“Feminist Woman”

1 2 3 4 5

1. Evaluative – −.13 .64∗∗∗ .51∗∗∗ .05 2. Potency −.55∗∗∗ – .08 .28∗∗ .68∗∗∗ 3. Sexual .77∗∗∗ −.52∗∗∗ – .46∗∗∗ .17

attractiveness 4. Confidence .04 .49∗∗∗ .04 – .42∗∗∗ 5. Homosexual– .38∗∗∗ −.28∗∗ .52∗∗∗ −.05 –

heterosexual

Note. Correlations above the diagonal are for “feminist man” (n = 73 women and 32 men); those below the diagonal are for “feminist woman” (n = 65 women and 34 men). ∗∗p ≤ .01. ∗∗∗p ≤ .001.

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attractiveness ratings. Confidence levels for “feminist man” were correlated positively with potency levels and hetero- sexuality ratings, but only among women. Finally, hetero- sexuality ratings for “feminist woman” were associated with more positive evaluative ratings and lower potency levels, but only among men.

Correlations were calculated between the four dimen- sions, the homosexual–heterosexual ratings, and the mea- sure of a participant’s feminist identification for the “femi- nist man” and “feminist woman” terms. A stronger feminist identification predicted higher scores on the evaluative and attractiveness dimensions for “feminist man,” r(101) = .36, p < .01, and r(101) = .40, p < .01, respectively, and “femi- nist woman,” r(97) = .34, p < .01, and r(97) = .32, p < .01, respectively. A stronger feminist identification was also cor- related significantly with rating “feminist woman” as being less potent, r(97) = −.20, p < .05.

Multivariate Analysis of Variance (MANOVA) of the Ratings

Because of the significant correlations between the depen- dent variables, a 2 × 4 MANOVA was calculated on the ratings for the evaluative, potency, sexual/physical attrac- tiveness, and confidence dimensions and the homosexual– heterosexual scale. The independent variables were partic- ipant sex (women, men) and the stimulus term (“feminist man,” “feminist woman,” “man,” “woman”).2 Significant multivariate main effects were found for participant sex, F(5, 392) = 11.6, p ≤ .01, and stimulus term, F(5, 392) = 42.1, p ≤ .01, and the interaction effect, F(5, 392) = 6.5, p ≤ .01. Each dependent variable was further analyzed by con- ducting univariate tests and those analyses are described in detail below. The MANOVA and univariate results are in Table 4 and the means and standard deviations for the ratings are in Table 5.

Table 4 Multivariate Analysis of Variance Results for the Four

Dimensions and Homosexual–Heterosexual Ratings as a Function of Participant’s Sex and Stimulus Term

Participant Stimulus sex (PS) term (ST) PS × ST_

Multivariate 11.6∗∗∗ 42.1∗∗∗ 6.5∗∗∗ Univariate Evaluative 11.3∗∗∗ 17.3∗∗∗ 4.0∗∗ Potency 10.9∗∗∗ 140.4∗∗∗ 6.3∗∗∗ Attractiveness 30.5∗∗∗ 31.7∗∗∗ 11.8∗∗∗ Confidence 1.3 14.7∗∗∗ 2.9∗ Homosexual/ 3.5 32.3∗∗∗ 1.9

heterosexual

Note. Degrees of freedom were 5 and 392 for all multivariate effects. For univariate effects, degrees of freedom were 1 and 396 for participant sex and 3 and 396 for stimulus term and the two-way interaction. ∗p ≤ .05. ∗∗p ≤ .01. ∗∗∗p ≤ .001.

For the univariate tests, significant two-way interactions between participant sex and stimulus term were examined by calculating one-way analyses of variance separately for women and men with the stimulus term as the independent variable. These analyses were followed by Tukey’s Honestly Significant Difference post hoc tests.

Evaluative dimension. The main effect for stimulus term was significant (η2 = .12); however, it was quali- fied by a significant two-way interaction (η2 = .03). Both women and men evaluated “feminist man” more positively than “feminist woman” (p ≤ .05). Also, “feminist man” and “woman” had the highest evaluations and were not signif- icantly different from each other (p ≥ .83). Women’s rat- ings for “feminist woman” did not differ significantly from their ratings for “woman” and “man” (p ≥ .08); however, men evaluated “feminist woman” the most negatively of the three terms (p ≤ .02). Men did not have significantly different ratings for “feminist man,” “woman,” and “man” (p ≥ .27). On average, women provided higher evaluative ratings than did men (η2 = .028).

Potency dimension. The stimulus term was significant (η2 = .51). Both women and men rated “feminist man” and “woman” as having similar levels of potency (p = .97) and as lower in potency than “feminist woman” and “man” (p < .01). “Man” was rated as more potent than the other three terms (p < .01). “Feminist woman” was rated as more potent than “feminist man” and “woman” (p < .01), but sig- nificantly lower in potency than “man” (p < .01). Although women tended to rate the terms significantly higher in po- tency than did men (η2 = .027), the two-way interaction (η2 = .046) indicated that this was only true for the terms “feminist man” and “woman,” t(103) = 3.2, p = .02, and t(98) = 4.4, p < .01, respectively.

Sexual/physical attractiveness dimension. There was a significant main effect of stimulus term (η2 = .194) that was qualified by a significant two-way interaction (η2 = .082). Women rated “feminist man” as less sexually/physically attractive (p ≤ .03) and “man” as more attractive (p ≤ .02) than the other three terms. “Feminist woman” and “woman” were rated similarly (p = .25). In contrast to women, men rated “woman” as more sexually/physically attractive than the other three terms (p < .01), with “femi- nist man,” “feminist woman,” and “man” rated similarly in attractiveness (p from .13 to .74). Also, the average ratings of women participants were significantly higher than those of men participants (η2 = .071), including the ratings for “feminist man,” t(103) = 3.0, p = .03, “feminist woman,” t(97) = 3.8, p < .01, and “man,” t(98) = 6.6, p < .01. Men rated “woman” higher in attractiveness than did women, t(98) = −2.2, p = .03.

Confidence dimension. The main effect for stimulus term was significant (η2 = .10); however, this was qualified

Judgments of Feminist Men 211

Table 5 Means (Standard Deviation) for the Ratings as a Function of Participant’s Sex and the Four Terms

Feminist Feminist man woman Man Woman Total

Evaluative Women .92 (.69)a .53 (.71)bc .47 (.69)b .82 (.62)ac .68 (.70)a Men .71 (.62)a −.11 (.58)b .46 (.60)a .73 (.50)a .45 (.67)b Total .86 (.67)a .31 (.73)b .47 (.66)b .78 (.58)a

Potency Women −.39 (.71)a .12 (.68)b 1.07 (.45)c −.43 (.44)a .12 (.85)a Men −.92 (.91)a .31 (.64)b .96 (.41)c −.85 (.48)a −.22 (.99)b Total −.55 (.81)a .18 (.67)b 1.04 (.44)c −.59 (.50)a

Attractiveness Women .30 (.80)a .66 (.76)b 1.27 (.60)c .90 (.75)b .79 (.81)a Men −.24 (.97)a −.02 (.97)a .28 (.76)a 1.24 (.82)b .36 (1.07)b Total .14 (.89)a .43 (.89)b 1.03 (.76)c 1.03 (.79)c

Confidence Women .41 (.78)a 1.01 (.58)b .47 (.85)a .44 (.68)a .58 (.77) Men .41 (.79)ab .85 (.77)b .70 (.64)b .01 (.79)a .46 (.82) Total .41 (.78)a .95 (.65)b .53 (.81)a .27 (.75)a

Homosexual–heterosexual Women −.16 (1.22) .51 (1.16) 1.08 (1.07) .79 (.95) .55 (1.20) Men −.66 (1.21) .03 (1.06) 1.29 (.96) .67 (.93) .29 (1.24) Total −.31 (1.20)a .34 (1.14)b 1.13 (1.04)c .74 (.94)c

Note. Within each row, means for the four stimulus terms with different subscripts were significantly different from each other at p < .05. Column “Total” means for women and men with different subscripts were significantly different from each other at p < .05. Sample sizes were as follows: women/feminist man = 73; women/feminist woman = 65; women/man = 76; women/woman = 61; men/feminist man = 32; men/feminist woman = 34; men/man = 24; men/woman = 39. Higher positive scores indicate a more positive evaluation and higher levels of potency, attractiveness, confidence, and heterosexuality.

by a significant two-way interaction (η2 = .021). Women rated “feminist woman” as more confident than the other three terms (p < .01) and “feminist man,” “woman,” and “man” as similar (p ≥ .96). In contrast to women, men rated “feminist man” as confident as “feminist woman,” “woman,” and “man” (p ≥ .10); however, “woman” was rated as sig- nificantly less confident than “feminist woman” and “man” (p < .04).

Homosexual–heterosexual rating. The main effect for stimulus term was the only significant effect for the homosexual–heterosexual ratings (η2 = .197). “Feminist man” was rated as less heterosexual than the other three terms (p < .01). “Feminist woman” had significantly lower heterosexuality ratings than “woman” and “man” (p < .05), which were not significantly different from each other (p > .05).

Summary. Compared to “feminist woman,” the term “feminist man” received higher ratings on the evaluative dimension and lower ratings on the potency dimension. “Feminist man” was also rated as the least heterosexual of the four stimulus terms and “feminist woman” as less het- erosexual than “woman” and “man.” Men tended to rate the feminist-labeled terms more negatively on attractive- ness than did women. Furthermore, women rated “femi-

nist man” as less attractive than “feminist woman,” whereas men rated “feminist man” similar in attractiveness to “fem- inist woman.” Men also evaluated “feminist woman” more negatively and rated “feminist man” lower in potency than did women. Also, “feminist man” was rated as less confident than “feminist woman” by women and as equally confident as “feminist woman” by men.

DISCUSSION

Perhaps the most interesting result of this study is that the term “feminist may” cue different judgments depending on whether it modifies “man” or “woman.” Contrary to what was predicted and to Breen and Karpinski’s (2008) find- ings, “feminist man” was evaluated more positively than “feminist woman.” Breen and Karpinski’s (2008) evalua- tion measure consisted of only three items, their sample size was smaller, and their sample may have differed from the current one on support for feminism. “Feminist man” was also rated significantly lower than “feminist woman” on potency, suggesting that stereotypically feminine character- istics (i.e., weak, emotional, submissive) may be considered more typical of “feminist man” than “feminist woman.” Al- though “feminist woman” was rated lower in potency than “man,” higher potency levels for “feminist woman” were associated with more negative evaluative and attractiveness

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ratings. This supports the finding that more stereotypically masculine characteristics in a feminist woman may result in more negative ratings on other dimensions (Bullock & Fernald, 2003; Suter & Toller, 2006). In contrast, potency levels did not significantly predict evaluative or attractive- ness ratings for “feminist man.” “Feminist man” was rated lower in confidence than “feminist woman” but only by women. Higher levels of confidence for “feminist man” were associated with higher evaluative and attractiveness ratings; however, higher levels of confidence for “feminist woman” were only associated with higher potency levels.

Traditionally, sexual orientation has been an important component of stereotypes about feminist women (Ramsey et al., 2007; Rudman & Fairchild, 2007; Swim, Ferguson, & Hyers, 1999), but results from the current study indi- cate that sexual orientation may play a somewhat stronger role in stereotypes about feminist men than about feminist women. “Feminist woman” was rated as less heterosexual than “man” and “woman,” and higher levels of heterosexual- ity for “feminist woman” were associated with higher levels of attractiveness. Nevertheless, “feminist woman” was still rated as being close to the midpoint of the scale among men and closer to the heterosexual anchor than the homo- sexual anchor among women, suggesting that the lesbian stereotype may not be as robust as it once was (Gourley & Anderson, 2007). In contrast, the average sexual orientation ratings for “feminist man” were on the homosexual side of the scale. This result is consistent with the prediction that “feminist man” would be rated closer to the homosexual an- chor than “feminist woman,” “woman,” and “man,” which all received ratings on the heterosexual side of the scale (see also Gourley & Anderson, 2007). Also, women tended to rate “feminist man” as being closer to the midpoint of the homosexual–heterosexual scale, or less homosexual, than did the men.

Not only was “feminist man” viewed differently from “feminist woman” on several dimensions, “feminist man” was also rated differently from “man” and similarly to “woman” on some dimensions. For example, “feminist man” had lower potency ratings than “man,” and it shared the highest evaluative and lowest potency ratings with “woman.” Both high evaluative ratings and low levels of potency are indicative of more stereotypically feminine characteristics (i.e., cooperative, affectionate, and patient on evaluative dimension; weak, emotional, and submissive on potency dimension). It is therefore not surprising that these two dimensions demonstrated a small, but signifi- cant, negative correlation with each other. Other research indicates that women tend to receive higher overall evalu- ations than feminist women and men (Eagly, Mladnic, & Otto, 1991; Haddock & Zanna, 1994; Prentice & Carranza, 2002). Finally, people tend to associate the term “feminist” with being a woman (Berryman-Fink & Verderber, 1985; Shearer, 2008; Williams & Wittig, 1997). Taken together, these results suggest that participants may have attributed more stereotypically feminine qualities to “feminist man”

resulting in high evaluative and low negative potency ratings.

Further support for the possible feminization of “fem- inist men” comes from the heterosexuality ratings. Het- erosexuality is assumed to be a hallmark of masculinity (Kilmartin, 2007; Messner, 2004), and feminine men are frequently perceived as having a homosexual orientation (Helgeson, 1994; McCreary, 1994). If feminist men are viewed as having characteristics that are more stereotypi- cally associated with being a woman, it makes sense that the feminist man’s sexual orientation might be perceived as deviating from heterosexuality. In support of this inter- pretation is the finding that lower levels of potency were associated with lower levels of heterosexuality for “feminist man.” Furthermore, in a study of open-ended descriptions of feminists, Twenge and Zucker (1999) found that the feminist man was sometimes described as engaging in “non- masculine” behavior, such as cross-dressing, a practice that is sometimes associated with gay men. Although intriguing, the association between homosexuality and feminist men needs further research because the bipolar measure for sexual orientation that was used in the current study was too simplistic. Future research should investigate how the multiple components of sexual orientation (e.g., sexual be- havior, self-identification; see Stein, 1999) and participants’ sexual orientation relate to perceptions of feminist men.

Men are less likely than women to identify as feminists and this study supports that notion; only one man indicated that he called himself a feminist privately or publicly. The present results may offer insight into some men’s avoid- ance of adopting the feminist label. Women may avoid the feminist label for fear of being viewed as a lesbian (Swim et al., 1999) and as being sexually and physically unattrac- tive to men (Rudman & Fairchild, 2007). A similar process may happen with men who may be perceived as being gay or bisexual and, hence, sexually and physically unattractive to women if they adopt the feminist label. As hypothe- sized, “feminist man” received the lowest sexual/physical attractiveness ratings overall; however, only women rated “feminist man” as being less attractive than the other three terms. Also, men may view being a feminist as something that contradicts or even negates their masculinity (Toller, Suter, & Trautman, 2004); therefore, the perception that feminist men may have feminine characteristics could serve as a further hindrance to men’s adoption of the feminist label.

Interestingly, compared to participants with weaker feminist identifications, participants with stronger feminist identifications were more likely to rate “feminist woman” as having lower potency levels. This finding suggests that people with a stronger feminist identification may be less likely to attribute stereotypically masculine characteristics to feminist women. Given this finding, one might pre- dict that, compared to participants with weaker feminist identifications, participants with stronger feminist identi- fications would rate “feminist man” as higher in potency

Judgments of Feminist Men 213

(i.e., exhibiting fewer stereotypically feminine characteris- tics), but this was not the case. It is possible that students with stronger feminist identifications have had less expo- sure to feminist men than to feminist women. As a con- sequence, they may resort more to gender stereotypes in rating feminist men than in rating feminist women (Deaux & Lewis, 1984). As predicted, participants with a stronger feminist identification were more likely to give higher eval- uations to the feminist-labeled terms (see also Breen & Karpinski, 2008; Liss et al., 2001; Myaskovsky & Wittig, 1997; Ramsey et al., 2007) and to rate the feminist-labeled terms higher in attractiveness than were participants with a weaker feminist identification. Unlike other studies (Ram- sey et al., 2007), the strength of a participant’s feminist identification did not predict sexual orientation ratings of the feminist-labeled terms.

Consistent with predictions, men provided more neg- ative evaluations and attractiveness ratings of “feminist woman” than did women (Burn et al., 2000; Hartung & Rogers, 2000; Henderson-King & Zhermer, 2003; Jackson et al., 1996; Lottes & Kuriloff, 1994; McCabe, 2005; Nelson et al., 1997; Peltola et al., 2004; Pierce et al., 2003; Rosell & Hartman, 2001; Rudman & Fairchild, 2007; Twenge, 1999; Twenge & Zucker, 1999; Williams & Wittig, 1997). How- ever, the prediction that men would provide more negative ratings of “feminist man” than women was only partially supported. Men’s lower sexual/physical attractiveness rat- ings of “feminist man” are not surprising, especially if it is assumed that most of the men were heterosexual. Also, men’s lower potency ratings for “feminist man” support research demonstrating that men tend to hold more tra- ditional gender stereotypes than do women (Frieze et al., 2003; Levant & Majors, 1997). However, women and men did not differ on their evaluative, confidence, and hetero- sexuality ratings of “feminist man.”

The possible link between the feminist label and per- ceived feminine characteristics in men needs more re- search. Helgeson (1994) found that a feminine male was attributed more of the “socially undesirable aspects of fem- ininity” (p. 662), such as being insecure and weak, than was a feminine female. In the current study, even though “feminist man” received low attractiveness and potency rat- ings, the term was still rated positively on the evaluative dimension, which assesses characteristics that are gener- ally desirable in everyone (e.g., being good-natured, pos- itive, and kind). Also, “feminist man” was rated as being no less confident than “woman” and “man.” Some peo- ple have expressed the opinion that feminist men would be more effective in influencing other men (and perhaps some women) to support the feminist movement if only they could behave in highly masculine ways (Suter & Toller, 2006). Women who are perceived as violating their tradi- tional gender roles are expected to effectively balance their feminine and masculine characteristics in public in order to be seen as more credible (Eagly & Karau, 2002; Prentice & Carranza, 2002). Perhaps feminist men who exhibit, or are

perceived as having, stereotypically feminine characteris- tics (Jackson et al., 1996; Toller et al., 2004; Twenge, 1999) face a similar challenge.

Finally, feminist men are important advocates for fem- inist goals; therefore, research investigating feminist men needs more attention. Future research should examine the importance of anti-gay prejudice and traditional gender- role ideologies in predicting attitudes toward feminist men. Given the small number of students in my sample that publicly or privately identified as feminists, the question of whether strongly feminist men and feminist women dif- fer in their views of feminist men remains to be answered. More research is also needed on stereotypes of feminists among more ethnically diverse samples of people. There are cross-cultural similarities, as well as differences, regarding stereotypes of women and men (Best & Thomas, 2004). In addition, the adoption of a feminist identity, attitudes to- ward feminism, and involvement in feminist social activism may be influenced by the interaction between a person’s gender and their racial or ethnic background (Aronson, 2003; Henderson-King & Zhermer, 2003; White, 2006). Therefore, it is possible that attitudes toward feminist men may also be influenced not only by a person’s gender, but also by their racial or ethnic background. Furthermore, the fear of appearing or being perceived as feminine may be only one factor that contributes to men’s avoidance of a feminist identification. Other factors that need investi- gation include age, developmental effects, cohort effects (Peltola et al., 2004), and the perception among men that there may be few personal benefits to identifying with the feminist movement. On the positive side, we need more research into what attitudes and experiences predict men’s self-identification as a feminist, such as personal and mean- ingful experiences with feminist women (Baird, Szyman- ski, & Ruebelt, 2007; Tarrant, 2008), and whether feminist identification leads to social activism in men as it does in women (Liss, Crawford, & Popp, 2004; Nelson et al., 2008; White, 2006).

Toller et al. (2004) suggested that envisioning the femi- nist movement as one that is concerned with ending many forms of discrimination, not just sexism, may convince men that feminism is not just for women and that identifying as a feminist will not damage their masculinity (see also Arber, 2008). As a dominant group in American society for more than three centuries, men’s participation in the feminist movement will continue to be invaluable in bring- ing about gender egalitarianism. As Ben Atherton-Zeman (2008), a spokesperson for the National Organization for Men Against Sexism, wrote about feminist men,

We will be our own role models, and the role models for other men and boys. Rejecting some of traditional masculinity, we will embrace what is useful to us and sometimes create new definitions of what it means to be a man . . . . We choose to respect, listen to, seek equality with and share power with the women in our

214 ANDERSON

lives and to encourage other men and boys to do the same (p. 259).

Initial submission: April 15, 2008 Initial acceptance: October 24, 2008 Final acceptance: December 19, 2008

NOTES

1. Factor analyses were also calculated separately for women and men. According to the scree plots and eigenvalues, four fac- tors emerged for each sex (accounting for 45% of the variance for women and 48% of the variance for men). The first two factors for women and men were most similar to the evalu- ative and potency factors in the primary analysis. However, the evaluative factor for men had fewer items loading on it than did the evaluative factor for women. Similarly, the po- tency factor for women had fewer items loading on it than the potency factor for men. The third factor was the same for both women and men and was similar to the sexual/physical attractiveness factor. Four items loaded on the fourth factor for women; three of the items overlapped with the confi- dence items identified in the primary analysis. Only two items loaded on the fourth factor for men, and only one item— assured–unsure—overlapped with the fourth factor for women. The two items that did not overlap with the confidence fac- tor in the primary analysis—aggressive–defensive for women and fast–slow for men—may tap certain aspects of perceived confidence.

2. A MANOVA was also calculated with order included as an independent variable. There were no significant order effects for any of the dependent variables. The same significant main and interaction effects for the variables of interest were found when order was included as when order was excluded.

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