Science+Business
BOOK REVIEW
Firmin DeBrabander, Do Guns Make Us Free?
New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2015, ISBN 978-0-300-20893-1, $30, Hbk
Timothy Hsiao1
Published online: 10 September 2015
� Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2015
The academic debate over gun control has largely been dominated by criminol-
ogists, social scientists, and legal scholars. It is surprising that philosophers have
paid little attention to this topic, given that both sides of the debate commonly
appeal to moral arguments. With that in mind, Firmin DeBrabander’s Do Guns
Make Us Free? is a very welcome addition to the debate. It is one of the few book
length treatments on the philosophy and ethics of gun ownership.
Advocates of permissive gun policies commonly argue that an armed society is
freer than a disarmed or unarmed society. DeBrabander’s goal is to counter and
reverse this argument against the gun rights movement. The central claim of his
book is that gun ownership stifles freedom, disrupts the rule of law, and is contrary
to civic virtue.
The book is divided into five chapters, each criticising common arguments made
by the gun rights movement. The first chapter evaluates the argument that
widespread gun ownership is necessary for preserving freedom. Against this,
DeBrabander argues that it is gun ownership itself that threatens freedom, for it
fuels an attitude of fear and distrust towards other people. This only works to
perpetuate the very problems that guns were meant to remedy. ‘‘The moral outlook
of the gun rights movement is harsh and intolerably cruel. It creates a self-fulfilling
prophecy: in treating persons harshly and viewing the world with suspicion and
hostility, it reaps hostility in return’’ (p. 50). True freedom is found not in arming
oneself, but in living alongside threats without letting them influence one’s mental
resolve.
The second chapter criticizes the argument that gun ownership provides a check
against government tyranny. DeBrabander surveys the historical background from
& Timothy Hsiao [email protected]
1 Department of Communication and Philosophy, Florida Gulf Coast University, 220 Reed Hall,
Fort Myers, FL 33965-6565, USA
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J Value Inquiry (2016) 50:659–665
DOI 10.1007/s10790-015-9512-y
which an individual right to gun ownership emerged, and argues that gun ownership
is incompatible with the political philosophy espoused by Locke, Tocqueville, and
others. The inherently violent nature of revolution means that it is justified only as a
last resort, and a culture in which guns are celebrated is one that shows contempt for
the rule of law.
An interesting part of this chapter is his critique of ‘‘stand your ground’’ laws.
The 2012 shooting of Travyon Martin by neighborhood watch captain George
Zimmerman generated intense debate over the status of these laws, which permit
individuals to use deadly force against a threat instead of retreating. Using this case
as his primary example, DeBrabander argues that stand your ground laws provide a
state-sanctioned license to kill. Such laws ‘‘sanction the escalation of violence
in situations where escalation is not necessary’’ (p. 80) and ‘‘run counter to the point
of civil society, which aims to make the law, and the ruling of a calm, informed, and
objective third party, override our limited, self-serving emotions’’ (p. 79).
The third chapter defends a novel thesis. DeBrabander argues that widespread
gun ownership is actually a means of political control that generates a false sense of
independence, thereby blinding gun owners to real injustices around them. Gun
ownership is ‘‘a cultural fixation that offers the illusion of freedom—and makes us
vulnerable to manipulation, abuse, and oppression. They invite us to feel free and
indomitable, while blinding us to the ways in which we are limited and dominated’’
(p. 138).
The final two chapters argue that gun ownership threatens democracy. Contrary
to what gun rights advocates point out, the presence of a gun – especially in
educational institutions – leads to more violence and generates a chilling effect on
free speech. The proper way to seek redress for our grievances, DeBrabander
argues, is non-violent. ‘‘If you face the government with violence, you may expect
violence in turn; you effectively announce what you esteem its true nature to be’’ (p.
212). Relying on a gun as a solution to society’s problems only perpetuates the cycle
of violence. Thus, ‘‘the violence of liberation, such as the gun rights movement
claims to endorse, would destroy the pace of freedom. Pervasive arms inhibit free
speech, and make assembly and democratic protest ultimately impossible’’ (p. 233).
Although DeBrabander’s book provides a very unique approach to the question
of gun rights, it is not without problems. I shall briefly outline five issues that cast
doubt on the strength of his arguments.
One serious problem that is evident throughout DeBrabander’s book is his failure
to consider crucial background issues regarding the nature of rights, their scope, and
the relationship between different types of rights (e.g. basic vs. derived rights, and
natural vs, positive rights). Rights-talk is used throughout the book without any
situating background or explication of what is meant! An overview of these
preliminary issues is absolutely necessary for any serious philosophical treatment of
gun ownership, for we cannot talk about the right to own a gun unless we first know
what rights are and what type of right this would be. Recognizing this, both pro-gun
and anti-gun philosophers alike have put forth detailed accounts of the nature,
scope, and justification of gun rights. See for example Wheeler (Samuel C. Wheeler,
‘‘Self-Defense: Rights and Coerced Risk-Acceptance,’’ Public Affairs Quarterly
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Vol. 11, No. 4 [1997]), Hughes and Hunt (Todd C. Hughes and Lester Hunt, ‘‘The
Liberal Basis of the Right to Bear Arms,’’ Public Affairs Quarterly Vol. 14, No. 2
[2000]), LaFollete (Hugh LaFollete, ‘‘Gun Control,’’ Ethics Vol. 110 [January
2000]), Huemer (Michael Huemer, ‘‘Is There a Right to Own a Gun?’’ Social
Theory and Practice Vol. 29, No. 2 [2003]), Hall (Timothy Hall, ‘‘Is There a Right
to Bear Arms?’’ Public Affairs Quarterly Vol. 20, No. 4 [2006]), Hunt (Lester Hunt,
‘‘The Right to Arms as Means Right,’’ Public Affairs Quarterly Vol. 25, No. 2
[2011]), DeGrazia (David DeGrazia, ‘‘Handguns, Moral Rights, and Physical
Security,’’ Journal of Moral Philosophy Vol. 11 [2014]), and Baker (Deane-Peter
Baker, ‘‘Gun Bans, Risk, and Self-Defense,’’ International Journal of Applied
Philosophy Vol. 28, No. 2 [2014]). DeBrabander’s failure to even consider the
debate at this basic level makes his arguments unclear, ambiguous, and sloppy. He
seems more content on producing quotations from famous political philosophers
than on establishing a working framework of his own. This trend of presenting
quotations from philosophers without integrating them into an argument is another
recurring problem throughout the book.
Additionally, DeBrabander’s critique of gun ownership is extremely narrow.
While he spends a good portion of the book addressing the pro-gun argument that
gun ownership is necessary to resist tyrannical governments, he does not seem to
engage the equally common argument that gun ownership is necessary for
empowering effective self-protection. According to this argument, gun rights are
derivative of the right of self-defense, which is itself derived from the right to life.
While he does briefly consider an argument along these lines, he does not devote
sufficient attention to it – certainly nowhere near the level that is required to engage
philosophers who have defended the self-defense argument at length.
This leads to my second problem with DeBrabander’s book. Although
philosophers have not paid as much attention to guns as they have other issues,
any philosopher writing on the ethics of gun ownership ought to have at least some
familiarity with the existing literature. Accordingly, it is surprising that DeBraban-
der does not interact with Hugh LaFollete’s (2000) classic paper on gun control, nor
does he engage with the pro-gun arguments of Todd Hughes and Lester Hunt (2000)
and Michael Huemer (2003). These three papers have been very influential in
shaping current direction of philosophical discussions on gun ownership. It is also
disappointing that Debrabander does not engage with Samuel Wheeler’s (Samuel C.
Wheeler, ‘‘Arms as Insurance,’’ Public Affairs Quarterly Vol. 13, No. 2 [1999])
arguments, as they constitute the most philosophically sophisticated statement of the
argument that gun ownership is necessary in order to resist tyrannical governments.
Since this particular argument is treated at length in his book, one would expect him
to engage its most competent advocate.
Indeed, one would expect an academic treatment of gun ownership from a
philosophical point of view to address the arguments of actual philosophers who
defend gun ownership in their professional work. Yet DeBrabander does none of
this. Instead, the bulk of his critique of the gun rights movement is directed more
towards its popular side. This might be fine for a popular level critique of popular
level arguments, but it is unacceptable for a scholarly work.
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This lack of engagement with the scholarly literature extends to philosophers
who are sympathetic to DeBrabander’s own position. Nicholas Dixon (Dixon,
‘‘Why We Should Ban Handguns in the United States,’’ St. Louis University Public
Law Review Vol. 12, No. 2 [1993]); ‘‘Handguns, Violent Crime, and Self-Defense,’’
International Journal of Applied Philosophy Vol. 13, No. 2 [1999]; ‘‘Handguns,
Philosophers, and the Right to Self-Defense,’’ International Journal of Applied
Philosophy Vol. 25, No. 2 [2011]), who in numerous places has defended a total ban
on handgun ownership, is not mentioned. Nor is David DeGrazia’s (DeGrazia, ‘‘The
Case for Moderate Gun Control,’’ Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal Vol. 24, No. 1
[2014]) ‘‘moderate’’ gun control mentioned, although his articles may have come
out too late for them to be considered in the book. There is also no interaction with
Jeff McMahan’s widely read critique of gun ownership in the New York Times, even
though McMahan wrote a favorable blurb for the book.
Third, DeBrabander’s treatment of the relevant empirical issues is seriously
deficient. Philosophers writing on gun control have the bewildering task of having to
sift through a mountain of sociological, criminological, and legal data. Of course,
while empirical considerations do not exhaust the philosophical side of the gun
control debate, any philosophically rigorous treatment of the issue must seriously
consider the empirical data. DeBrabanders interaction with the criminological
literature is limited to a few pages where he criticizes John Lott’s claim that right-
to-carry laws decrease crime. Even here, his critiques are superficial and mostly
one-sided. He seems unfamiliar with numerous other studies corroborating Lott’s
findings, as well as replies by Lott and others (See Carlisle E. Moody, John R. Lott,
and Thomas B. Marvell, ‘‘Did John Lott Provide Bad Data to the NRC? A Note on
Aneja, Donohue, and Zhang,’’ Econ Journal Watch Vol. 10, No. 1 [2013]). For
instance, Plassman and Whitley (Florenz Plassman and John Whitley, ‘‘Confirming
‘More Guns, Less Crime’,’’ Stanford Law Review Vol. 55 [2003]) analyzed county
level data from 1977 to 2000 and found ‘‘annual reductions in murder rates between
1.5 % and 2.3 % for each additional year that a right to carry law is in effect’’. Gius
(Mark Gius, ‘‘An Examination of the Effects of Concealed Weapons Laws and
Assault Weapons Bans on State-level Murder Rates,’’ Applied Economics Letters
Vol. 21, No. 4 [2014]) verified the findings of Lott and Mustard (John R. Lott and
David Mustard, ‘‘Crime, Deterrence, and the Right-to-Carry Concealed Handguns,’’
The Journal of Legal Studies Vol. 26 [1997]) and found that ‘‘states with restrictions
on the carrying of concealed weapons had higher gun-related murder rates than
other states,’’ which suggests that ‘‘restrictive concealed weapons laws may cause
an increase in gun-related murders at the state level’’. Moody et al. (Carlisle E.
Moody, Thomas B. Marvell, Paul R. Zimmerman, Fasil Alemante, ‘‘The Impact of
Right-to-Carry Laws on Crime: An Exercise in Replication,’’ Review of Economics
and Finance Vol. 4 [2014]), also corroborating Lott and Mustard, found that right-
to-carry laws ‘‘significantly reduce murder’’ and that there is ‘‘no robust, consistent
evidence that RTC laws have any significant effect on other violent crimes,
including assault’’.
While it is true that Lott’s work has been criticized, it is by no means clear that
his work does not hold up to scrutiny. A truly even-handed investigation of the
empirical literature reveals a much different story, in which it is not clear that right-
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to-carry laws work to increase or reduce crime. One gets the impression that
DeBrabander simply searched for criticisms of Lott’s work while ignoring the other
side of the debate.
DeBrabander also ignores an entire category of empirical considerations that are
very relevant to the debate: the prevalence of defensive gun uses and the efficacy of
resistance with a gun. Together, these two considerations form a key component of
the self-defense argument for gun ownership, so an omission of this level is simply
inexcusable. On this topic, defenders of private gun ownership frequently cite Kleck
and Gertz’s (Gary Kleck and Marc Gertz, ‘‘Armed Resistance to Crime: The
Prevalence and Nature of Self-Defense with a Gun,’’ Journal of Criminal Law and
Criminology Vol. 86, No. 1 [1995]) survey indicating that gun use is extremely
prevelvant (up to 2.1 million times per year). As Kleck (Gary Kleck, Targeting
Guns: Firearms and Their Control. Aldine Transaction [1997]) points out, more
than fifteen different surveys all corroborate the view that defensive gun uses are
extremely prevalent. Elsewhere, Kleck has also found that resistance with a gun is
an effective – and in many cases, the most effective – means of resisting violent
attack. Kleck and Delone (Gary Kleck and Miriam Delone, ‘‘Victim Resistance and
Offender Weapon Effects in Robbery,’’ Journal of Quantitative Criminology Vol. 9,
No. 1 [1993]) found that ‘‘victim gun use was the resistance strategy most strongly
and consistently associated with successful outcomes for robbery victims’’. Tark
and Kleck (Jongyeon Tark and Gary Kleck, ‘‘Resisting Crime: The Effect of Victim
Action on the Outcomes of Crimes,’’ Criminology Vol. 42, No. 4 [2004]) found that
‘‘a variety of mostly forceful tactics, including resistance with a gun, appeared to
have the strongest effects in reducing the risk of injury’’. Kleck and Sayles (Gary
Kleck and Susan Sayles, ‘‘Rape and Resistance,’’ Social Problems Vol. 37, No. 2
[1990]) found that out of six methods of forcefully resisting rape, resistance with a
gun was the most effective means of reducing injury.
If these claims are true, then there is a strong case to be make for gun ownership
and carrying for the purpose of individual self-defense. Unfortunately, DeBrabander
ignores this issue completely.
Fourth, the lack of engagement with the literature manifests itself in the quality
of DeBrabander’s arguments. Most of his critiques of gun ownership are entirely
speculative, supported by nothing more than a series of quotations or naive
psychoanalysis. We are told, for instance, that guns are a sign of ‘‘insecurity’’ that
generate ‘‘distrust’’ and that gun owners are ‘‘disproportionately suspicious’’ people
who ‘‘decide they will live under the influence of fear’’. Where exactly is the
evidence for such a bold and disparaging claim about the psychology of gun
owners? We are given none. The actual research on this suggests a different story.
Hauser and Kleck (Will Hauser and Gary Kleck, ‘‘Guns and Fear: A One Way
Street?’’ Crime and Delinquency Vol. 59, No. 2 [2013]) found that ‘‘higher fear
among nonowners encourages them to become gun owners, but lower fear among
gun owners does not encourage gun relinquishment… [and] that gun acquisition does not reduce fear, but relinquishment increases fear, suggesting the relationship
between guns and fear may be asymmetrical’’.
A recurring theme throughout the book is that gun ownership is incompatible
with freedom, democracy, and respect for the rule of law. The arguments for these
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claims, however, are vague and unclear (due in part to the insufficient attention paid
to conceptual issues). This is made worse by the fact that DeBrabander does not
engage with the relevant literature. If individuals really do have a right to own guns
that is derived from their being an effective means of self-defense – an argument
that DeBrabander doesn’t consider – then gun ownership would arguably advance
these things. Unless DeBrabander regards self-defense as immoral, there will always
be a strong prima facie right to own effective weapons for individual defense. And
while it is true that citizens in civil society cede police powers to agents of the state,
this cession is not absolute. As Baker (Deane-Peter Baker, ‘‘Guns Bans, Risk, and
Self-Defense’’) puts it:
Even in a state with a high functioning security apparatus the ordinary
person’s legitimate need to exercise self-defense is not zero (were that not the
case self-defense would not be a meaningful legal defense). We could usefully
picture each citizen ceding the right to use force to the state everywhere except
within a thin time–space ‘bubble’ around the citizen, where the precise size of
that bubble is defined by the speed and effectiveness of the state’s response to
threats of violent harm. As the old saying goes, ‘when seconds count, the
police are only minutes away’: it is in those minutes that the citizen must, and
may, exercise her right to self-defense personally. And it is in those vital
minutes that the citizen must have the necessary means to effectively exercise
that right.
To his credit, DeBrabander does make the argument that widespread gun ownership
leads to more harms than benefits. But why should we think that this point by itself
defeats an individual right to own a gun? As many theorists have pointed out, rights
are moral trumps that are supposed to resist utilitarian attempts at weighing harms
and benefits. Even if it were true that gun ownership led to more harms of a certain
type, this does not by itself imply that the right to own a gun is therefore overridden.
Indeed, Michael Huemer (2004) has argued that the harms need to be several times
greater than the benefits in order for gun ownership rights to be outweighed.
Elsewhere, I have also argued that gun policies should still aim to be reasonably
permissive even in the face of an ‘‘outweighing’’ argument (Timothy Hsiao,
‘‘Against Gun Bans and Restrictive Licensing,’’ Essays in Philosophy Vol. 16, No. 2
[2015]).
DeBrabander’s incredibly shallow critique of ‘‘stand your ground’’ laws deserves
special mention. At several points, it is not clear that he even understands what these
laws are. Focusing on Florida’s version of the law, his critique seems to be that (a),
these laws sanction the needless escalation of force in cases where this isn’t
necessary and (b) a mere presumption that one’s life is in danger is enough to be
granted immunity under stand your ground laws.
These points are quite simply false. Readers interested in a survey of the self-
defense law may consult Branca (Andrew Branca, The Law of Self-Defense. The
Law of Self-Defense, LLC. [2013]) and Ayoob (Massad Ayoob, Deadly Force:
Understanding Your Right to Self-Defense. Gun Digest [2014]). The use of force
under stand your ground laws are subject to scrutiny just like any use of force under
the banner of self-defense. All that Florida’s stand your ground law did was remove
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the duty to retreat. The rules of engagement were not changed. Thus, merely
claiming that one felt threatened is not enough to justify a successful defense under
stand your ground. Nor is it the case that those who claim such a defense are ipso
facto guaranteed immunity from a trial. The case is first presented to a judge, who
decides whether there is merit to move forward with an indictment. If no merit is
found, then the case is dismissed. Such a decision is made based on the merits of the
case, and not on the basis of one’s mere claim that his life was in danger.
DeBrabander’s use of the Trayvon Martin shooting as an example of how stand
your ground laws go wrong is misguided. Florida’s stand your ground law was
completely irrelevant to this case, given that Zimmerman was physically unable to
retreat! As Ayoob (Massad Ayoob, Deadly Force) points out in his detailed analysis
of the case, ‘‘the evidence showed incontrovertibly that Zimmerman, straddled by
his attacked in the MMA mount and being savagely beaten while supine, could not
possibly have retreated or otherwise escaped at the time he pulled the trigger’’. It is
for this reason that the defense did not attempt to get the case dismissed on the basis
of the state’s stand your ground law. The case was simply that of classic self-
defense.
Indeed, the actual facts of the case tell a very different story than the one
suggested by DeBrabander. According to the best evidence, Zimmerman, in his
capacity as elected neighborhood watch captain, was confronted and knocked to the
ground by Martin, who then started beating him mercilessly. While Martin was not
armed with a weapon, his physical advantages over Zimmerman meant that there
was a significant disparity of force, one that arguably justified Zimmerman’s use of
his gun in self-defense. The facts were apparently so clear that the State Attorney’s
Office did not deem it necessary to present the case to a grand jury. An indictment
was only issued by a special prosecutor acting under her own authority.
Finally, while DeBrabander clearly thinks that widespread gun ownership is bad
public policy, he affirms in the preface that he is ‘‘not averse to others owning guns,
provided ownership is wisely regulated’’. But he does not tell us what ‘‘wisely
regulated’’ means! If gun ownership is sometimes permissible, then under what
circumstances may individuals own a gun? And how are we to balance this
admission with the later claim that gun ownership threatens democracy, freedom,
and the rule of law? The lack of clarification on these seemingly contradictory
statements makes it very unclear what DeBrabander is trying to accomplish. He
seems more concerned with preaching the evils of gun ownership in vague and fiery
terms than with providing actual solutions to the problems they pose, solutions
aimed at balancing the interests of both sides.
Much more could be said about his arguments. Needless to say, I did not find the
book to be very persuasive. The value of Firmin DeBrabander’s Do Guns Make Us
Free? is limited to its critique of popular arguments for gun ownership.
Philosophers interested in the philosophy and ethics of gun ownership are better
served by looking at the existing journal literature on the topic.
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